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[Editor's Preface: The year is 2007 A.D. A collapse of stock market
values has provoked a general demoralization of American society,
particularly among employees who had heavily invested their pension
assets in equity instruments. A series of work stoppages-beginning first
among employees in the remaining unionized sectors of construction and
automobile production, and spreading gradually to government offices and
finally to the all-important nonunion computer and financial services
industries-has led to a general strike halting virtually all production and
distribution in the country. Managerial confidence has reached an all-time
low. At the invitation of their agents in Congress and the White House,
the leaders of American finance and commerce assembled in Philadelphia
on January 15th to develop a plan for rescuing the country. In desperation,
unable to reach consensus after weeks of raucous debate, this assemblage
of American Capital-including, among others, representatives of the
Business Roundtable, U.S. Chambers of Commerce, National Association
of Manufacturers, National Federation of Independent Business, Labor
Policy Association, Securities Industry Association, and Society for
Human Resource Management-petitioned the AFL-CIO (whose ranks
had been swelled by millions of general striker-recruits) to develop new
rules for reconstituting the social order.
"" ' is a widely respected, nonaligned intellectual active in the
Movement for Progressive Social Change, a consortium of "public
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interest" and employee-advocate organizations. The AFL-CIO, mindful
that there are as many non-members as members in the work force, has
asked G to participate in formulating guiding principles for labor market
reform for the upcoming deliberations over a laborist social charter. (A
different group has been convened to propose recommendations for capital
market reform.)
The following colloquy represents some of the initial musings
between G and ,p,,2.P is a leading tactician for the AFL-CIO, assigned by
the Federation to consult with G on this enterprise critical to the success of
the workers' state. The Federation wants G's independent views but they
also want G to take into account P's (hence, organized labor's)
perspective.]
I. REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH?
G: First, we must tackle the question of redistribution of wealth. Should
the new state provide some mechanism for periodic redistribution, or
should we rely on the outcomes of private bargaining, perhaps as
supplemented by social rights legislation establishing minimum terms for
all?
P: Redistribution is a difficult, divisive task. We have a rare opportunity
to develop a new society and I fear that openly espousing redistribution of
wealth will galvanize dissidents among the forces of American Capital,
along with their allies in Congress, to oppose by any available means the
enactment of a new social contract. More fundamentally, we have to take
the long view. We know from the differences in public support for social
security and social welfare programs, that direct grant programs are not
politically sustainable. Working people will soon forget how we got into
this mess in the first place, and they will come to resent the fact that they
are being taxed to help others. The only improvements in social
allocations that will last are those that were "earned" through collective
bargaining and unceasing political struggle.
G: I hear you. But if we do not provide a mechanism for periodic
redistribution of wealth, history will soon repeat itself. We will have a
society where initial endowments, whether due to forces of nature or those
of nurture, will inevitably produce inequality.
Any form of bargaining, whether individual or collective, builds upon
existing endowments. Collective bargaining has a role to play in
2. For "Proletarian" or "Parishioner," depending on your view of the causes of the
revolution.
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establishing standards for fair worker treatment, but it does not offer a very
promising technique for creating a new egalitarian society. To avoid
replicating a society of "haves" and "have nots," we have to go beyond
private bargaining outcomes.
My preliminary view is to propose a Social Redistribution Fund,
whereby twenty-five percent of the GNP is reserved for biannual lump-
sum redistributions. This fund will be drawn from general tax revenues.
(We will have to consider later whether to retain a national income tax or
move to a consumption tax with built-in progressivity features.) We
should not levy employment taxes to fund our social programs. We want a
full-employment economy to the extent feasible. We do not want to
freight the decision to hire or retain people with adverse tax consequences;
nor do we want to distort other economic decisions. I agree with you that
public attitudes will revert to the old ways of thinking, and for this reason,
whatever principles of redistribution are agreed upon need to be preserved
in the Constitution.
P: I still disagree that we should be using our limited political capital in
this way. In any event, who gets what under your scheme?
G: We will be guided by John Rawls' ingenious heuristic.3 If we were
making decisions from behind a "veil of ignorance," not knowing how we
ourselves would end up in the society, I believe we would make ample
provision for the least fortunate, the least able, the least desired of our
society. I envision distributions to families below the poverty line, to the
blind and infirm, to the less intelligent, to the physically and aesthetically
challenged. I know this principle of redistribution reflects what some
consider an irrational level of risk-aversion. We are not buying insurance
in the conventional sense, where we are only concerned with insuring
against average risks. We are providing a floor for a civilized society
below which our people will not be allowed to fall. Distributions will be
made every two years, and will take account of intervening changes in
circumstances. To the greatest extent feasible, the transfers will be in the
form of cash rather than in-kind. People are the best judge of what they
need. Government will play a role to make sure that institutions providing
education, job-training and other services to recipients are bona fide and
competent. Families incapable of providing for children will continue to
need social welfare services and, possibly, family court intervention.
3. See JOHN RAWLS, A THBORY OF JUSTICE (1971). On the utilitarian predecessor, see
John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking,
61 J. POL. ECON. 434 (1953); John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational
Behavior, 44 Soc. RES. 623 (1977).
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P: Does everyone have to work in your "utopia"? Does government
become the "employer of last resort"?
G: The job of government is to enable citizens to be gainfully employed
to the best of their abilities. Every able-bodied adult citizen will have to
work in order to participate in the Social Redistribution Fund.
Government will provide necessary child care assistance to enable people
to attend to their jobs. Individuals unable to find jobs will be put to work
cleaning our cities and will be paid at the minimum wage. Over time,
those on "workfare" will be expected to find regular jobs, and government
will promote their placement by providing necessary training. Remember,
these are not intended, and will not be allowed, to become career positions.
II. PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION AND
DIsTRIBUTION?
P: The capitalists have lost their footing. Do we now seize the initiative
and socialize the means of production and distribution? The capitalist
class has made a shambles of the economy. They have lost the moral right
to hold on to their property.
G: But socialization of property will require just compensation, not
because of anything in the old Constitution but because we do not want to
encourage a flight of capital. If we appropriated the factories and offices
without compensation, we would pay dearly over time for that decision.
And remember we need a rich and growing society in order to provide jobs
and fund social equality.
Putting aside the question of compensation, I doubt we would be able
to do a particularly good job of running the economy on our own. We can
learn from history. Ownership of the means of production and distribution
is an old socialist shibboleth. It was a dream that turned sour wherever it
was tried. There is no reason to believe that we will be better at it.'
P: But how do we ensure that corporations are run in a manner
consistent with social objectives? Shouldn't the state demand minority
representation on corporate boards and the opportunity to influence major
corporate decisions?
G: To a considerable extent, I am afraid, we will have to rely on
decentralized decisions in a competitive marketplace. Corporations will
have to obey the laws we write, and we will take steps to ensure that
4. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLrrz, WITHFER SOCIALISM? (1994).
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corporations do not engage in monopolistic practices. But your question
does prompt me to consider proposing social appointment of at least one
"public interest director" in every corporation whose shares trade on the
national markets. Companies will still be run by their owners; obviously, a
single vote can be easily overcome by majority holders. The director's
role will be limited to ensuring that corporate decisions are at least
informed by a broader public perspective.
P: What do we do about the short-term horizons of investors5 that
brought us to this point of social paralysis?
G: It's hard to say what caused the fall in market values, or whether
stock markets fail to value properly long-term investments. We certainly
need to rethink pension policy-particularly the wisdom of the shift from
defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans (where participants have too
much of a say over investment decisions) and the appropriate fiduciary
rule for investing pension assets. Perhaps it would also be desirable to
create additional incentives to lengthen holding periods, as long as we are
careful to avoid significantly reducing market liquidity. We should be
open to further interventions, but only after careful study of their impact
on the cost of capital for American enterprise.
P: Even if we retain private ownership, don't we have to build in a social
accountability mechanism? Can we really allow corporations to continue a
single-minded pursuit of shareholder value without regard to the social
consequences of their actions?
G: What would this mechanism look like? Are we going to require state
approval of every corporate decision resulting in layoffs? Can we really
determine whether the benefits to the corporation of a restructuring or
merger are outweighed by the costs incurred by employees and the
community? If we make it hard for corporations to operate as efficiently as
possible, are we shooting ourselves in the foot? We may be able to help
particular workers to keep their jobs, or particular communities to keep
plants open, but capital can "go on strike" by escaping to other areas of the
country or abroad where returns are higher.7
5. See Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the
Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 513 (1993).
6. But see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97
COLurM. L. REv. 1519 (1997); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the
Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 52 (1987).
7. See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser, Constrained Optimization: Corporate Law
and the Maximization of Social Welfare, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CoRPoRATE AND
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IT. CODETERMINATION?
P: I hadn't thought of it until now, but why don't we adopt the German
model of codetermination? By law, one-half of the boards of directors of
all firms over a certain size would be comprised of representatives directly
chosen by the employees of the company; we would, however, allow the
shareholders' representatives to cast the deciding vote in the event of a tie.
Capital would not be tied down in this world, but it would have to listen to,
and hopefully take account of, the employees' perspective.
G: The idea is a promising one, but we will need to learn more about the
German experience. I have some questions: First, are the employee
representatives too powerful in Germany in the sense that they are able to
block actions that German corporations should take to remain competitive
and continue making capital investments in the home country? I am
troubled by the persistent double-digit unemployment in Germany that
preceded unification of the former East German states and reports of new
capital fleeing Germany for the U.K., Ireland and South Carolina. I do not
want to confuse correlation with causation, but we do not want double-
digit unemployment here and we need capital investment to fuel social
reform. Second-and this question proceeds from a converse premise-is
employee representation on corporate boards of little consequence to the
cost of capital in Germany because the German stock market is relatively
undeveloped, and hence German firms rely principally on bank debt rather
than equity financing? Are banks in Germany the critical counterweight to
employee/union directors? Third, can employee/union directors be held
accountable to employee interests in a country like ours where most
companies do not have strong inside-the-firm employee organizations?
This has been a very useful discussion on corporate board issues, a
text of which will be forwarded to the group considering capital market
reform.
IV. MANDATORY UNIONISM?
P: Then, let's tuni to what's within our bailiwick. I was beginning to
worry that our "velvet revolution" wouldn't be producing much in the way
of fundamental change. Shouldn't we, at the very least, mandate unions
for all enterprises having fifteen or more employees? The employer class
is on its knees. Now is the moment to strike for genuine representation for
all American workers.
COMMERCIAL LAW (Kneus & Wolt eds., forthcoming).
8. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLTCAL ROOTS OF
AMERiCAN CORPORATE FINANCE 213-15 (1994).
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G: The moment is indeed ripe for change. But whatever we do has to be
carefully considered. Can we be certain that all American workers want to
be represented by independent, exclusive bargaining agents? That they all
wish to submit to the rule of political majorities, to the risk of union.
discipline, to the diversion of a portion of their salaries for union dues, to
the use of dues for union political activity?
I have the same problem with mandating works councils-a common
feature in continental European systems. Such works councils would be
another form of mandate. And, particularly since our unions are
enterprise-based, the mandated councils would tend to become unions in
sheep's clothing or effectively displace unions (an eventuality not likely to
find favor with our friends in organized labor).
P: This is just a question of deciding who bears the costs of collective
action. The status quo is that employees and unions (as prospective
service providers) have to overcome collective action problems to organize
successfully. Let's just reverse the premise: establish a status quo where
everyone is organized, and it's the people who want to retain individual
bargaining who organize for decertification."0
G: A good point. I do think, however, that whatever we do must be
reciprocal. If we mandate unionism as a new status quo, we have to be
sensitive to the collective action problems that may prevent the principals
(the employees) from monitoring or changing their agent (the union or
works council). Let's turn to what our collective labor law should look
like.
V. EMPLOYEE-FRIENDLY LABOR LAW REFORM?
P: We can create an employee-friendly labor law and entrench it in the
Constitution: Any two or more workers should have a right to insist on
collective representation and to have the employer bargain with their
designated representative until a majority coalesces behind a representative
who will then become the exclusive bargaining agent."
9. See WORKER REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION SURVEY: REPORT ON THE
FINDINGS 49 (Dec. 1994) (prepared for Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers; conducted by
Princeton Survey Research Associates).
10. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990).
11. See Matthew Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority
Employee Representation, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 195 (1993).
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G: We do need labor law reform, but is nonexclusive, minority unionism
the way to go? Most other countries that have plural union structures also
envision bargaining occurring on the multi-enterprise level. Only in Japan
do we find both enterprise bargaining and nonexclusive bargaining agents.
With nonexclusive unions, employers find it easy to "divide and conquer."
We know that Japanese employers use the threat to recognize a "second
union" as a lever to discipline the primary union. And even where unions
bargain with multi-employer associations, plural unionism does not work
well. In France, oniy one agreement applies to any one enterprise. French
employers are able to pick and choose by entering into an agreement with
one of the "representative" union federations and making that the operative
agreement for all.
2
P: But we are not talking about plural unionism as the end-state, only as
an intermediate stage until a majority representative emerges.
G: Even if plural structures are viewed as an intermediate stage, I do not
see a workable approach. What do we do about terms that require uniform
application across a work force? Do we allow two or more employees
effectively to set wages and hours for all? (Is this really a better state of
affairs than allowing the employer who must take account of firm-wide
effects to set the rule, in the absence of a majority representative?) Also,
what about shifting employee coalitions? Do we allow employees
essentially to abrogate agreements that they don't like by joining other
minority organizations that will negotiate a different deal? I see here a
recipe for balkanization and instability, not the productive environment we
need to expand social wealth and provide the resources for redistribution.
P: Perhaps. Let's not lose sight, however, of the need for a system that
allows employees at minimum cost to choose independent representatives.
We should at least codify card-check certification and recourse to "interest
arbitration" where the parties cannot reach agreement on their own. 3 If,
say, sixty percent of the employees sign authorization cards, there is no
need for an election. This is enough of an initial showing of support to
require bargaining to begin; ultimately, the union's bargaining power will
depend on its ability to encourage employees to "vote with their feet" by
authorizing a strike. For first-time bargaining situations, the law also
should help nascent organizations by resolving impasses through the use of
panels of neutral decision makers who would have the authority to impose
12. See Michel Despax & Jacques Rojot, France, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA
OF LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 251 (R. Blanpain ed., 1987).
13. See Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
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an initial contract.
G: Cards are problematic. Do we know why employees sign them? Do
employees get all the information they need-especially on the costs and
risks of unionization-from an essentially one-sided communication with
the union organizer? If we are going to travel down the card-check
certification route, don't we need also to permit card-check
decertification? Is this desirable? Or are we better off with the solemnity
of an election process and the legitimacy that such a process confers on the
bargaining representative?
We should directly address the costs of union organization. Let's
lower the barriers: allow union organizers on company property where
such access does not interfere with the business. Any "captive audience"
speech held by employers should trigger a correlative right of the
organizing union to address the employee electorate. Any employee
discharged for union activities must be promptly reinstated, with fines
imposed on the employer for engaging in a retaliatory discharge.
P: In this new social order, are we still allowing employers to express
opposition to independent organization?
G: I think it is unavoidable. We can't assume that unionism is the right
course for all employees and all firms in all circumstances. Employers are
there to express the opposing view. They can't engage in coercive tactics,
of course; and managements that are found to be repeat violators will be
barred from business by the state. But noncoercive employer opposition
has a role to play in the process, unless we embark on an approach that
makes it easy for employees to opt in (card-check certification) and out of
(card-check decertification) collective representation. If employees have a
low-cost means of disavowing union representation, we can be less
concerned about whether their initial choice was informed and freely
made. But where we are going to establish fairly significant barriers to
decertification-in the interest of bargaining stability-we cannot in good
conscience prevent the employer from expressing the opposing
perspective. (I am assuming, of course, that our Constitution will not
incorporate any right of "employer free speech" in this context.)
VI. MANDATORY MULTI-ENTERPRISE/SECTORAL BARGAINING?
P: Don't we need a mechanism for requiring multi-enterprise/sectoral
bargaining? Shouldn't our new state "take wages out of competition"?
Companies within an industry should not be able to take market share from
unionized enterprises because of lower labor costs. Let them compete on
1998]
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the basis of the quality of their products and services-not their
willingness to pay people poorly or treat them harshly. Let's finally give
effect to section 6 of the Clayton Act: "The labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce." Where, say, twenty-five percent of
an industry is unionized, the parties to the collective agreements should be
able to impose the average economic terms of the agreements on the
nonunion sector. This will, in turn, create incentives for nonunion firms to
get involved in multi-employer bargaining at the outset.
G: Remember, we are establishing a state and economy that will operate
for the benefit of the larger society. Is it clearly desirable that unionized
firms be insulated from labor-cost competition? If the unions and firms in
the organized sector have adopted costly, inefficient staffing rules, what
claim do they have on the workers' state to impose collectively bargained
labor-cost regimes on all who wish to enter the particular industry? Are
we going to set up a state agency to determine which terms of collective
agreements merit imposition on nonunion companies and which do not? If
the representatives in Congress, in their collective wisdom, determine that
some terms (such a minimum wage and safe workplace) must be treated as
minimum conditions for a civilized society, so be it. What is the
justification for bypassing the democratic process and imposing the
product of private bargains on unwilling firms?
We also have to take into account the fact that our companies have to
compete effectively in global markets. Whatever we may think of the
social desirability of labor-market competition, our companies will not be
insulated from competition on this basis. We do not operate as an island
unto ourselves. The days when American producers could confine
themselves to harvesting a huge domestic market are gone. We have to
help U.S. companies improve productivity and global market share, while
at the same time making sure that gains are equitably shared with workers.
VII. WRONGFUL TERMINATION LEGISLATION?
P: Can we at least end the American anomaly and enact a
comprehensive wrongful termination law: In all firms with fifteen or more
employees, a discharge without good cause should be unlawful. Such a
measure would promote job security and embolden employees, now
fearful of retaliatory discharge, to seek independent representation when it
is in their best interest to do so.
G: You have a point, but if we are going to adopt the European model,
don't we need to incorporate all of the features of that model? I have in
mind a centralization of all employment litigation in specialized courts
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where the remedy for a wrongful termination is not essentially unlimited
damages determined by civil juries, but rather some multiple of pay
assessed by an administrative tribunal. 4  There are risks here in
discouraging job growth because of increased dismissal costs, but we
should shoulder those risks for the sake of providing a general remedy
against improper supervisor decisions. I wonder, however, whether this
proposal would be supported by the plaintiffs' bar, our allies in the
Movement for Progressive Social Change.
VIII. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE NONUNION SECTOR?
G: What,about firms that remain nonunion in our economy? Should
employers be able to form committees of managers and employees to
discuss matters of mutual concern, including pay and working
conditions? 5 How about the rule that prevails in Canada-that dominated
employee organizations cannot act as exclusive representatives or bar
election petitions but are otherwise not unlawful? 6
P: We need to continue to prohibit employer involvement in employee
representation systems. Employers can discuss terms with individual
employees or groups of employees. They should not, however, be
permitted to discuss terms with representatives of the employees unless the
representatives are able to function as autonomous agents of employee
interests-free to insist on their substantive positions, to form alliances
with other labor organizations, and to call for work stoppages without fear
of employer discipline. This is what a right of self-association calls for.
This should be an unequivocal, impregnable standard for a workers' state.
G: Let's think about "employee involvement" as representing two
different systems. The first is what might be called an "on line" system-
where employees are assembled in work teams to take collaborative
responsibility for the work tasks of the team and essentially supervise
themselves. Should these systems be lawful?
P: Yes, provided the work teams involve no representational function
14. See Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws in Other Countries: Some
Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J. CoMP. L. 310 (1985).
15. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union"
Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 125 (1994).
16. See Daphne G. Taras, Company Unionism in Canada: Legal Status and Legislative
History, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NNH ANNUAL MEETIG, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 152-58 (Paula B. Voos ed., Jan. 4-6, 1997).
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and wages and working conditions are dictated to the teams rather than
negotiated with them.
G: If representatives from the work teams-say, the safety
representative-sit on a company-wide body to discuss company-wide
issues, should such a structure be unlawful in the absence of authority to
act as independent employee representatives?
P: Yes. Representation requires independence. The company cannot
bargain on both sides of the table.
G: Now, let's turn to "off line systems"-where employees volunteer or
are selected to sit on committees to discuss company-wide problems.
Should this be unlawful in the absence of authority to act as independent
employee representatives?
P: If the committees discuss pay and working conditions, same answer.
G: But why are we adopting these restrictions? Employees know that
these structures are not independent unions, and as we have discussed they
will be able at little cost to opt for independent representation. Does it
make sense in our state to adopt a rule for nonunion firms that holds
employees to the stark choice of unilateral management or independent
representation-and nothing in between?
P: I get the feeling as Yogi Berra would put it: this is "deja vu all over
again." Let's knock off for the day.
[Editor's Note: After a long day, G and P retired for the evening to
listen to old Woody Guthrie and Pete Seeger songs.]
